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Abstract 
After the 1997 Asian financial crisis, South Korea (Korea) and Thailand implemented financial 
restructuring in a similarly successful manner and regained the healthiness of their banking 
sectors. However, when the Lehman shock hit their financial markets in 2008, its impact on the 
two countries was quite different. Korea, which had performed better in the financial 
restructuring than Thailand, was driven to the brink of a second financial crisis in 2008 while 
Thailand weathered the shock easily. This paper addresses this paradoxical contrast from the 
path dependence perspective, focusing on different historical paths of formation and change of 
the respective financial systems. It concludes that the successful state-led financial restructuring 
in Korea fostered banks’ propensity of active lending while the private sector-led reform in 
Thailand only reinforced banks’ conservative lending behavior. Furthermore, betraying the 
critical juncture theory, the severe economic crises helped reinforce the institutional legacies in 
the two countries, resulting in aggressive foreign borrowing by Korean banks and timid 
borrowing by Thai banks. These differences explain their contrasting vulnerability to the 
Lehman shock. 
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1. Introduction  
After the 1997 Asian financial crisis (AFC), South Korea (hereafter Korea) and Thailand, which 
had suffered great losses, were able to manage financial restructuring. They tackled the 
internationally standardized menu of restructuring measures such as the disposition of non-
performing loans, the increase of capital base, and the realignment of the banking sector. Their 
restructuring improved the healthiness of the banking sectors, and the impact of the 2008 
subprime loan crisis, or the Lehman shock on their financial markets, was seemingly negligible.  
The two countries were quite different in their respective vulnerability to the global 
financial crisis (GFC) triggered by the Lehman Brothers shock. Korea, which had performed 
better than Thailand in the financial restructuring and therefore expected to weather the GFC 
better, was actually more severely affected and driven to the brink of a second financial crisis in 
2008. What is the reason for this paradoxical contrast? This paper will address this question 
from the path dependence perspective, focusing on different paths of formation and 
restructuring of the financial systems in the two countries.  
Korea and Thailand have been selected for this study, because while they differed 
greatly in the post-AFC restructuring and impacts of the GFC, they share many common 
external conditions. First, the two countries fell into a similarly serious crisis in 1997-98 and 
were required to undergo liberal financial reforms in exchange for the IMF rescue package. 
Second, although their export and GDP growth were adversely affected by the economic 
downturn in industrial countries during the GFC, the exposure to toxic assets was low in the two 
countries because local banks had not invested heavily in the US subprime loans. By comparing 
the Korean and Thai experiences, we will be able to clarify the importance of domestic factors, 
especially in different institutional configurations of the respective financial systems. 
While the progress of their financial reforms and the impact of the Lehman shock drew 
broad scholarly attention, the differences between the two countries have been largely ignored. 
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Hamilton-Hart (2008) surveys the post-crisis financial reforms and the subsequent trajectories 
of the banking systems in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. However, her main focus 
is on how much their banking systems changed in a decade after the AFC. It is not clear how 
such changes affected each country’s vulnerability to the GFC or the response. Ghosh (2006, 
63-72) also only discusses the improvement of bank soundness and efficiency, and the general 
trend of financial intermediation in East Asia after 1997.  
On the other hand, several economists examining the impact of the Lehman shock crisis 
give attention to East Asian resilience during the financial storm and policy measures 
responding to the crisis (Dowling and Rana 2010; Bhaskaran and Ghosh 2010; Saw and Wong 
2010). However, few paid due attention to the different degrees of external vulnerability among 
the East Asian countries. None have shed light on the differences between Korea and Thailand.  
As mentioned above, this study will rely on the path-dependence approach and attempt 
to explain how external vulnerability of the two countries was affected by the post-1997 
financial restructuring. It will also discuss how their ways of restructuring were historically 
shaped by their pre-1997 financial systems.  
This study will be structured as follows. Section 2 will examine the process in which 
existing financial systems in Korea and Thailand faced mounting pressures for change in the 
pre-AFC period leading to consequential deregulation and liberalization. As a result, the 
financial sectors in the two countries accumulated a huge amount of short-term debts and 
heightened external vulnerability, eventually causing the AFC. Section 3 will clarify how the 
crisis helped the resurgence of traditional institutional configurations and shaped the basis for 
restructuring the banking sector. Section 4 then argues how the revived institutional legacies 
contributed to the emergence of different external vulnerability in the two countries on the eve 
of the GFC. Finally, some theoretical implications of our study are offered in conclusion. 
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2. Liberalization and the onset of the 1997 crisis 
2.1 Institutional persistence and change  
On the eve of financial liberalization, the financial systems in Korea and Thailand were in a 
sharp contrast. Korea had formed a system characterized as “rent-for-enterprises” while 
Thailand had a “rent-for-banks” system.  
In Korea, the powerful state controlled the banking sector and intervened to mobilize 
financial resources, both domestic and external, to promote manufacturing industries. For this 
purpose, the state supplied financial rent to chaebol enterprises through various measures 
including the maintenance of low real interest rates, credit allocation, debt guarantee, allocation 
of externally borrowed money, the subordination of the central bank to the pro-industry 
government, and moderately expansionary fiscal and monetary policies (Choi 1993; Woo 1991). 
In Thailand, the private banking sector was powerful while the state was less 
intervening. The government protected the existing banks by restricting new entries. Beyond 
that, however, the state avoided interventionist policies and succumbed to private banks’ desires 
for fiscal balance, money supply control, and central bank independence, all of which were 
regarded as important to avoid inflation and lowering real interest rate (Doner and Unger 1993; 
Suehiro 2005). 
These characteristics of the financial systems in the two countries were reflections of 
the power and interest of stakeholders – namely state, banks, and industrial enterprises – during 
the formative period. Once firmly established, institutions have a strong tendency to persist 
(Krasner 1984; Pierson 2004). Even when a certain institution has disappeared as a formal 
organization, actors sometimes accept the existing patterns of behavior as guidance for future 
behavior (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 13-17). This is because, facing uncertainty, they have 
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incentive to maintain former institutions or behavioral patterns from which they once enjoyed 
benefit.1  
The path-dependence tendency notwithstanding, institutions do change because success 
and/or failure of the existing institutions transform interest and power of the concerned actors. 
First, under new domestic and external circumstances, the existing system may not be able to 
continuously function properly and satisfy everybody. Disenchanted or dissatisfied actors will 
demand transformation of the system. Second, changes in power balance among stakeholders 
may lead to actors’ efforts to readjust the system to the new balance of power or to recover the 
former balance of power. Third, formerly absent players may appear and make new demands for 
change. These new players cover both domestic and external actors. 
In short, institutions create both continuing and transforming tendencies. The balance 
between persistence and change is deeply affected by political processes developed among 
stakeholders. 
 
2.2 The Korean case 
In Korea, a serious move to systemic transformation began during the 1980s in the form of 
liberalization of the domestic financial market.  
Serious concern regarding inflation and corporate debts spread among political and 
bureaucratic leaders. Technocrats in economic ministries especially feared that the mounting 
non-performing loans of the big corporations would cause a debt crisis. It was also worrisome 
that inflation caused by financial repression was destabilizing the economy (Cho and Kim 1997, 
42).  
In addition, observing a mounting criticism among the public opinion against the 
government favoritism of chaebols, the Chun Doo Hwan government felt the necessity to rectify 
                                                        
1. Weir and Skocpol (1985, 120-21) shows the way past policy was institutionalized, or policy legacy, 
shapes understanding of politicians and technocrats about future policy and determines the kind of policy 
that can be developed. 
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the image of a cozy relationship between the government and the big business (Lim 2003, 48; 
Zhang 2003, 75). 
To these domestic pressures joined the external demand for financial-market 
liberalization. Pressure from OECD, IMF, and the US government became stronger after the late 
1980s. The Kim Young Sam government (1993-98), longing for OECD membership, felt an 
especially strong pressure to quicken the reform (Haggard 2000, 37). 
The process of liberalization began in the domestic market. The national banks were 
privatized throughout the 1980s. However, to avoid chaebol’s dominance over the privatized 
banking sector, the government imposed a limitation on ownership. The maximum ownership 
by any single shareholder was limited to 8% in 1982. The limit was tightened to 4% in 1994 
(Bank of Korea 2006, 18). In addition, the government continued to supervise the banks by 
controlling appointment of top executives and interfering in their budget-making (Park and Kim 
1994, 192).  
Nevertheless, big business-led export expansion and democratic opening in the latter 
half of the 1980s strengthened chaebol power. Chaebols, though excluded from the banking 
sector, had enough resources and reputation to establish non-bank financial institutions to raise 
money domestically and externally. Their influence on public policy was also enhanced as 
politicians and political parties increasingly relied on financial contributions from big 
corporations (Kang 2002, 153-54, 158-66). 
The financial policy of the government was constrained by the expanding influence of 
chaebol. The interest rate was liberalized only in a very gradual manner because higher interest 
rates could raise the already heavy debt burden of the chaebol corporations (Choi 1993, 49-51; 
Chung 1994, 115).  
Chaebol influence also affected the order of the liberalization of international capital 
transactions. In 1994, the short-term capital transactions were liberalized, preceding the 
liberalization of long-term capital accounts such as equity investment and FDI. This sequence 
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perfectly fit chaebol preferences for obtaining easy short-term capital to expand export-oriented 
production while excluding the possibility of foreign intrusion into the lucrative businesses. 
Public opinion is usually critical of the privileged status of chaebols in Korea, but chaebols 
could count on the public with regard to common aversion of foreign capital intrusion.2 
Before the AFC, technocrats in the Kim Young Sam government intended to rectify debt 
dependence of chaebol enterprises to avoid debt crisis similar to the one experienced in the early 
1980s. However, taking advantage of the financial deregulation and liberalization, chaebol 
enterprises now could finance their businesses with corporate bonds, equity, and/or foreign 
short-term borrowing instead of bank credits. This made chaebols more independent of the 
government. They competed vigorously to raise money and invest in heavy and chemical 
industries. However, given the excessive supply of semiconductors and shipbuilding in the 
international market, increase in labor costs, and the technology lag behind advanced industrial 
countries, this competition only led to excessive investment (Haggard 2000, 55) and lower 
profitability, and aggravated chaebol indebtedness. The average corporate debt ratio (total 
liabilities/stockholders’ equity) in the manufacturing sector reached as high as 317.1% in 1996 
and 396.3% in 1997 (Bank of Korea 2000).3  
The failure of chaebol firms such as Hanbo steel and Kia Motors triggered the crisis. 
Fingers point at the Kim Young Sam government for lacked consistency and speed, thereby 
making the rollover ratio of foreign short-term capital decline and bringing about capital flight 
(Dooley and Shin 2000, 157). The massive capital outflow was precipitated by the well-known 
double-mismatch of foreign short-term borrowing (Yoshitomi and Ohno 1999; Park 1998, 29).  
 
                                                        
2. Lee Kyu-Sung, who served as Minister of Finance (1988-1990) and Minister of Finance and Economy 
(1998-1999), writes: “(Before the AFC) in Korea, FDI was being impeded by restrictive investment 
policies and widespread ambivalence and suspicion among the general public” (Lee 2011, 118). 
3. There was moral hazard on the chaebol side. Chaebols counted on the government to come to their 
rescue as it had done during the previous crises because they are too big to fail. Hahn (2000) concluded in 
his statistical analysis that the bigger chaebols are, the more their investment behavior is risk-taking. 
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2.3 The Thai case 
Financial liberalization was delayed in Thailand, but the factors which precipitated the reform 
were similar. Government technocrats discerned functional deficiencies in the existing financial 
system. But different from the Korean case in which inflation and corporate debts were main 
problems, the primary problem in Thailand was a broadening gap between savings and 
investment. To meet the expanding demand for business financing, government officials 
attempted to develop a local bond market and enhance foreign-capital intake (Suehiro 2005, 39; 
Bank of Thailand 1992, 331-32).  
Criticism against oligopolistic business groups dominated by big commercial banks also 
mounted gradually. As the polity was democratized, the government felt the necessity to tackle 
this problem.4 The liberalization was expected to benefit broader segments of society.  
Then the Thai government faced increasing international pressures to comply with 
trade-related obligations under the GATT Uruguay Round agreements and to implement capital-
account liberalization demanded by the World Bank, IMF, and the US government (Pasuk and 
Baker 2002, 164-65; Zhang 2003, 113, 129-30). 
Under the circumstances of rapid economic growth and expanding influence of political 
parties, newly emerging firms and local entrepreneurs sought for financial liberalization to 
reduce the cost of raising money. Big banks, however, opposed the competition-enhancing 
liberalization of interest rates. Furthermore, the Thai Bankers’ Association, together with the 
Bank of Thailand (BOT), resisted the deregulation of foreign entry into the banking sector. They 
feared it would destabilize the banking system and intensify competition (Zhang 2003, 120-24).  
As a virtual compromise, foreign capital transaction was freed in 1993 only in the 
offshore market (Bangkok International Banking Facilities: BIBF). By this measure, foreign 
                                                        
4. Author’s interview with Tharin Nimmanhemin, former Minister of Finance (1992-1995) at Bangkok, 
February 20, 2009. 
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entry in the financial market was avoided. However, foreign short-term money did not stay in 
the offshore market. It flew into the domestic market massively. 
Different from the Korean experience, domestic banks and finance companies invested 
the money in real estate and securities. These financial institutions had not developed enough 
capacity for financial intermediation under the long-term government protections and sought 
quick profits in the non-productive sectors. This practice led to an asset bubble, the same 
double-mismatch of foreign borrowing (Ammar 2005, 72, 80), and several conspicuous 
defaulting of finance companies and banks. However, the government continued to rescue ailing 
nonbanks and commercial banks (Thitinan 2001, 118-25, 194-95), thus deepening the wound 
incurably. 
 
 
3. Financial restructuring 
3.1 Post-crisis restructuring measures 
Theoretically there are three main areas of restructuring after a serious financial crisis 
(Claessense et al. 2001; Honohan and Klingebiel 2000). They are (1) to dispose of NPLs (non-
performing loans) through setting up public and/or private asset management corporations, (2) 
to recapitalize ailing or failed banks through injecting public, private, and/or foreign fund, and 
(3) to realign the banking sector through nationalization, private M&A, and/or the invitation of 
foreign banks. The third task is connected to the second one, because recapitalization is deeply 
related to the ownership structure and the government-bank relationship.  
While these three tasks are common for crisis-ridden countries including Korea and 
Thailand, their approaches differ with regard to the role of the government in the process. For 
instance, a government-led approach was taken in Korea while a market-driven approach was 
adopted in Thailand. This section will reveal that path-dependent institutional constraints re-
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emerged prominently during the immediately post-crisis period while the influence of change-
seeking political forces receded (at least temporarily) due to the crisis.  
 
3.2 The Korean case 
Korea’s financial restructuring featured strong and prompt government initiative and substantial 
acceptance of the entry of foreign capital.  
The Kim Dae Jung government set up the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) to 
lead the restructuring process. This commission did not hesitate funding for disposing of bank 
NPLs through the government-established Korean Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO) 
and recapitalizing the ailing banks. The public funding that was injected from 1997 to 2003 
amounted to approximately 30% of GDP in 2002 (Lim and Hahm 2004, 20, 22). In concrete 
terms, FSC nationalized two banks, injected public funding in 19 banks to support their effort to 
reduce NPLs and to strengthen their capital bases, and closed down five banks (and also 30 
merchant banks).  
Under the FSC supervision, several of these ailing banks were merged with or 
purchased by relatively healthy local banks or by foreign capital. The government approved 
100% bank ownership by foreigners and raised the single shareholder ceiling from 4% to 10% 
in 2002 (Bank of Korea 2006, 18) to enhance incentives for foreign investors. As a result of the 
bank realignment, the number of banks decreased from 33 in 1997 to 18 in 2006 including 5 
governmental banks (Bank of Korea 2006, 19, 22, 32). 
The government also launched dauntless corporate reforms by which the largest 
chaebols were eventually forced to exchange their businesses (“Big Deal”) to cut down excess 
capacities. Smaller chaebols were compelled to liquidate insolvent businesses under the 
guidance of government-supervised banks (“Workout”). The government further ordered the 
five largest chaebols to lower their debt-equity ratio to below 200% by the end of 1999 (Mo and 
Moon 2003, 128-33). 
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Existing literature mentions several reasons why the Kim Dae Jung government was 
able to take such a radical approach in the face of powerful chaebol forces and the labor 
pressure against employment reduction. First, Kim Dae Jung had always been in the opposition 
and had no chaebol connections (Haggard 2000). Second, there was a general feeling that 
chaebols were responsible for the crisis. Under such circumstances, it was difficult for chaebols 
to resist government measures. Third, the national crisis was so profound that the general public 
as well as political parties buttressed the reforms (Jung 2001, 17-18; Lim and Hahm 2004, 15).  
These factors, however, do not explain why the Kim government came up with such 
interventionist policies to realize neoliberal reforms. It could be understood only if we take into 
account the institutional legacy of the Korean financial system. The state used to manage the 
banking sector and credit allocations. The virtual control by the state persisted even after bank 
privatization.  
The institutional persistence of the financial system is reflected in the structure of bank 
supervising institutions. FSC, the new leading coordinator for restructuring, was integrated into 
the ministerial hierarchy dominated by the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) (Lee 
2004, 157; Kim and Lee 2006, 415-16). Most of the executive officials of the FSC came from 
MOFE. For example, Lee Hun Jai, the first chairman of FSC (1998-2000), started his career in 
the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and experienced financial crises in the 1970s. His successors 
were also career officials from MOF or MOFE. 
Under the pre-crisis Kim Young Sam government, these technocrats considered the 
possibility of introducing prudential regulations, lower debt financing by the private companies, 
reduce the risk of short-term borrowing, and to improve international competitiveness of the 
Korean banks by reducing their number. Their ideas were never put into practice because they 
could not gather political support to these measures that could damage chaebol and bank 
interests at least for the short run.  
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The obstacles were decisively removed by the crisis and an opportunity window was 
now opened for serious reforms (Kim 2002, 219). Consequently, MOFE and FSC willingly 
intervened in the financial market not only to promptly solve the NPL problem and implement 
bank recapitalization but also to scale up the size of the financial institutions. 
Once the reforms started, the state dominance of the banking sector was further 
enhanced as the government raised the stock holding of the banks by injecting public funds 
(Jung 2001, 16). At the beginning of 2001, the government owned 21.7 trillion won of the 
commercial bank equities, which represented 48% of the total equities of all financial 
institutions in Korea (Lee 2002, 163-64). The personnel network connecting MOFE and banks 
also contributed to the government control of the banks. The network was built upon Amakudari 
or parachute appointments of MOFE officials to the banks.5 Such government ownership and 
networks smoothed the merger of banks and the resolution of NPLs. 
Another institutional legacy of the Korean financial system was the continuing 
limitation of chaebol ownership of banks. The government faced a dilemma of choosing 
chaebol or foreign investors when it needed money to recapitalize fragile banks and to re-
privatize the nationalized banks. The government chose foreign capital (Kim and Lee 2008, 
176; Mo 2008, 268), because the public aversion against chaebol was greater than that against 
foreigners during the early post-crisis years. The government, however, was cautious enough to 
also limit the foreign ownership of individual financial institutions for fear of nationalist 
backlash.6 
                                                        
5. For instance, in March 2007, a former vice minister of MOFE assumed the presidency of Woori bank, 
one of the four largest banks. Website of Woori Financial Group (http://www.woorifg.com/) (accessed 
August 15, 2007). Woori bank was newly founded in 2001 after the merger of four small- and medium-
sized banks under the government initiative. 
6. Public criticism against foreign investors soon mounted because people believed that foreigners 
purchased the Korean banks saved by a huge amount of public money at a bargain price (Kim and Lee 
2008, 176). This opposition to foreign capital was evident in the news report about the suspicion of illegal 
acquisition of Korea Exchange Bank by Lone Star Funds, an American equity fund, in 2003 (The Korea 
Times, March 13, 2007). 
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3.3 The Thai case 
In contrast to the Korean case, the Thai financial restructuring was characterized by gradual and 
private sector-led reforms and a highly limited acceptance of foreign capital. Different from the 
Kim Dae Jong government, the Chuan Leekpai government did not play an active role in 
financial restructuring.  
To be sure, the government established the Financial Sector Restructuring Authority 
(FRA) in 1997 and closed down 56 finance companies and liquidated their assets. 7  The 
government also nationalized four small and medium-sized banks. However it did not take 
forceful measures with regard to the big banks. Private banks were left to act on their own 
initiative to dispose of NPLs and strengthen their capital bases.  
Under the Announcement for Comprehensive Financial Restructuring of August 14, 
1998, the government planned to inject 300 billion baht for bank recapitalization. In practice, 
only ten financial institutions participated in the scheme and 70.63 billion baht, or 23.5% of the 
originally planned amount, was utilized before the deadline (the end of 2000). Large private 
banks such as Bangkok Bank, Thai Farmers Bank (currently Kasikorn Bank), and Bank of 
Ayudhya did not join the scheme and opted to recapitalize on their own through the stock 
market (Veerathai 2003, 26-31). 
The market-driven approach was also observed in the NPL disposal. The Chuan 
government established the Corporate Debt Restructuring Advisory Committee (CDRAC) to 
foster debt-restructuring negotiation among private companies, but did not form a public entity 
to force NPL disposal. Instead, it allowed private banks to set up their own asset management 
companies (AMC). The speed of NPL reduction was naturally slow. To quicken the process, the 
Thaksin government, which came to power in 2001, shifted to a government-led approach and 
established a public Thai Asset Management Corporation (TAMC) similar to Korea’s KAMCO 
                                                        
7. Those disposed assets amounted to 14.3% of the total assets of all financial institutions including 
commercial banks, approximately 18% of GDP (FRA 2002, Table 1.2.1; Veerathai 2003, 14). 
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(Veerathai 2003, 73-76). Nevertheless, it turned out that 80.5% of the NPLs transferred to 
TAMC came from state-owned banks and their AMCs, not from private ones (author’s 
calculation from TAMC 2002). 
Neither did happen any large-scale alignment of the banking sector (except the 
nationalization of some small and medium-sized banks). In contrast to the Korean case, foreign 
investors were allowed to buy only small and medium-sized banks. The share of foreign banks 
in the Thai banking sector was as small as 4.3% in 2005, while the corresponding figure for 
Korea was 55.6% (World Bank 2007).8 The oligopolistic structure of the banking sector 
remained the same in the post-crisis period. 
The reason why the Thai government adopted the private sector-led approach and 
limited the entry of foreign capital is the resurgence of institutional constraints of the financial 
system due to the weakening of change-seeking political forces under the crisis. The emerging 
firms and small and mid-sized local entrepreneurs, potential supporters of anti-big bank policy, 
were hard hit and weakened by the crisis. Their loss was deepened when the government 
implemented the IMF-sponsored austere monetary and fiscal policies and made the fire sale of 
local assets to foreigners (Hewison 2005, 315-16). As a consequence, as opposed to financial 
liberalization in the pre-crisis years, they could not exert political pressures on the government 
to speed up NPL disposal and accept greater participation by foreign banks, policies 
contradicting big bank preferences. 
Relieved from political pressures, officials of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and BOT 
simply reinforced their traditional behavior of non-intervention. The Thai officials apparently 
felt more comfortable in the market-centered approach even in the post-crisis years. In an 
interview with the author, a BOT director said anonymously that the Thai government adopted 
the market-led approach, in contrast to the government-led approach of Korea, due to the 
                                                        
8. Here “foreign banks” are defined as banks in which more than 50% of the shares are owned by 
foreigners. 
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difference of “culture.”9 A former co-director of the MOF Fiscal Policy Office said that he was 
not sure that government initiative would be more efficient than private initiative in tackling 
financial restructuring.10  
The second institutional legacy of the Thai financial system was the oligopolistic 
structure of the commercial banking sector and its preference for limited government 
intervention in the financial market except for the policy of excluding foreign competition. Even 
after the AFC, assets of the biggest five local banks (out of around fifteen) continued to surpass 
70% of the total banking sector assets. Four of the five were private. Such private dominance of 
the financial market, different from the government-centered Korean experience, contributed to 
enhancing the influence of private banks over the government policy for recapitalization, NPL 
disposal, and foreign entry. Consequently, as mentioned above, large private banks owned by 
founder families and their close friends did not participate in the government scheme for 
recapitalization. The top bank executives worried that the government might intervene in their 
lending practices and demand their resignation.11 Neither did Thai bankers want government 
involvement in the NPL problem. They preferred to solve it by their own initiative even if the 
speed of the rectification was slower.  
Finally, the banking sector as well as the Thai government coincided in their aversion 
against foreign dominance of the financial market. Lacking anti-bank sentiment equivalent to 
the anti-chaebol feeling among the general public, the Thai government did not need to rely on 
foreign capital for their effort to restructure. Consequently, while allowing foreign investors to 
participate in the recapitalization of small and medium-sized banks, the government has not 
approved majority ownership of major banks by foreigners.12 When foreign shareholders were 
                                                        
9. February 27, 2007, Bangkok. 
10. Author’s interview with Veerathai Santiprabhob in January 31, 2007, Bangkok. 
11. Author’s interviews with Veerathai Santiprabhob (see fn.10) and with Twatchai Yongkittikul, 
Secretary General of the Thai Bankers Association in February 9, 2007, Bangkok. 
12. Financial Institutions Act that was approved by the National Legislative Assembly in 2007 allows 
BOT to give permission to foreigners for shareholding of banks up to 49%. In addition, over 49% 
shareholding of a bank by foreigners is permitted only when Ministry of Finance considers it necessary 
for stabilizing the bank.  
 
 
16 
allowed to increase their stocks in large banks such as Kasikorn Bank and Bangkok Bank, their 
stocks were non-voting shares. Many restrictions were also imposed on foreign banks 
operations. Even if they acquire the status of local banks, they are allowed to open no more than 
four branches. A Japanese banker in Bangkok complained to the author that the acquisition of 
the status of a local bank would not be worthwhile since foreign-dominated banks were subject 
to stricter supervisions by the BOT.13  
 
 
4. Different impacts of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
4.1 Financial systems on the eve of the GFC 
The financial restructuring contributed to the recovery of the banks’ healthiness and stability in 
both countries. As Table 1 shows, they gradually improved the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) 
and the NPL ratio through the 2000s, thereby helping the recovery of bank lending after the 
AFC.  
However, the speed of recovery was much greater in Korea than in Thailand. In fact, the 
Korean bank lending - loans and discounts – constantly increased in the post-crisis years (Figure 
1) while the Thai bank lending turned upward only in early 2002 (Figure 2). 
The loan/deposit rate was again greater in Korea than in Thailand. The Thai lending 
behavior was quite conservative probably due to the slow pace of NPL disposal. Their 
loan/deposit rate was below 100% during 2000-2007, which means that the banks loaned less 
than what they received as deposits (Figure 3).14 The ratio exceeded 100% only in 2008. In 
Korea, the loan/deposit rate exceeded 100% as early as in the fourth quarter of 2003 and 
reached 140% on the eve of the GFC (Figure 4). 
                                                        
13. Author’s anonymous interview with an executive of a Japanese commercial bank operating in 
Thailand (February 8, 2007). 
14. Possibly the rest of the deposit was invested in safer assets such as government bonds. 
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The capacity of financial intermediation of the banking sector also differed in the two 
countries. Although the proportion of direct finance (e.g. stocks and other equities) rose in 
corporate financing in both Korea and Thailand, the dependence on financial loans was much 
higher in Korea than in Thailand as shown in the flow-of-funds tables (Table 2 and 3).  
Finally, the Korean banking sector showed more stability than its Thai counterpart. The 
Bank Z-score shown in Table 2 is a proxy for banking stability. It scores higher when the return 
on asset (ROA) is higher, the capital adequacy rate is greater, and/or when the standard 
deviation of ROA is smaller (which means less volatility of return). According to Table 4, the 
annual averages of Bank Z-scores for 2002-2008 were similar in Korea and Thailand: 6.67 for 
the former and 6.20 for the latter. However, Korean scores were clearly in the upward trend 
while Thai scores were quite volatile. 
In short, whereas the two countries’ bank healthiness and stability enhanced, the 
recovery of bank lending and its contribution to corporate finance were more successful in 
Korea than in Thailand. This is the result of speedier restructuring through state-led measures in 
Korea.  
Ironically, however, when the GFC hit Asia, Korea received by far more serious impacts 
than Thailand. Korea actually was driven to the brink of a second financial crisis in 2008 while 
effects on Thailand were minor. 
In many cases, external factors are referred to as crucial in explaining the impact of the 
crisis on each country. For instance, Chalongphob and Somchai (2009) point out that external 
debts and exposure to subprime loans were low in Thailand, while Shin (2010) and Takayasu 
(2010) argue that the unexpected shift of foreign money in the wake of the Lehman shock was 
critical for the Korean crisis. According to an IMF report (IMF 2010, 62), Korean banks had 
very little direct exposure to the troubled US credit instruments. The main cause of the new 
crisis in Korea was the accumulation of short-term foreign debts and their sudden outflow, the 
same phenomenon as the AFC. To understand why the same failure happened in Korea (but not 
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in Thailand) where the financial restructuring progressed much more deeply and quickly, we 
again need to refer to the institutional legacies of the financial systems. 
 
4.2 The Korean case 
Somewhat ironically, it was the active lending behavior of the refurbished banks, both domestic 
and foreign, that caused the renewed external vulnerability of the Korean economy.  
As seen in Figure 1 and Figure 4, Korean banks, freed from the NPL burdens, increased 
their lending in the 2000s and raised the loan/deposit ratio from 100% (2004) to 140% (2008). 
In order to supplement the shortage of deposits,15 banks increasingly depended on foreign 
borrowings. Table 5 shows that Korea’s total external liabilities rose from $225.2 billion in the 
fourth quarter (Q4) of 2006 to $365.1 billion in the third quarter (Q3) of 2008, just before the 
Lehman crisis broke out. Half of this, or $189.6 billion, was short-term debts. The largest short-
term debtors were domestic banks and domestic branches of foreign banks, which held short-
term debts amounting to $65.4 billion and $93.9 billion respectively (the sum total represented 
43.6% of the whole external debt in Q3 of 2008).  
Domestic banks and domestic branches of foreign banks borrowed the short-term 
money to finance the investment by residents in foreign funds and also to finance shipbuilders’ 
contracts.  
On the one hand, the foreign portfolio investment boomed in the middle of the 2000s 
reaching $56.44 billion in 2007 (Bank of Korea Website). This boom was precipitated by two 
factors. First, Korean depositors, unsatisfied with low deposit interest rates, shifted their assets 
to foreign investment funds as well as the capital market. Second, the scope of the tax 
exemption on dividend income extended to overseas listed shares during 2007-2009 (Takayasu 
2010, 187). Asset management companies that managed foreign funds, fearing won appreciation, 
                                                        
15. In fact, Korean households shifted some of their financial assets from deposits to portfolio investment 
against a background of an investment boom in 2006-07 to the extent that commercial banks fell short of 
funds in Won (SMBC Seoul 2009, 15).  
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hedged exchange risk by making forward contracts with domestic banks and foreign bank 
branches. These banks subsequently augmented foreign short-term borrowing to adjust their 
position. 
On the other hand, against the backdrop of the world-wide shipbuilding boom between 
2003 and 2008, Korean shipbuilders received orders equivalent to $215.1 billion US dollars as 
of November 2008 (SMBC Seoul 2009, 5).16 The shipbuilders also hedged exchange risk by 
making forward contracts with banks, which in turn increased foreign short-term borrowing.17  
Although these foreign debts of banks were actually guaranteed by foreign currency 
that those asset management companies and the shipbuilders would be paid in the future, such 
heavy dependence on foreign short-term debt made both domestic banks and foreign bank 
branches vulnerable to liquidity risks and changes of external financial conditions, despite little 
exposure to subprime assets (Shirai 2009, 34).  
To make the situation worse, the government’s prudential regulation was lenient for 
foreign bank branches. Domestic banks were strongly pressured to compensate their debts with 
foreign currency-denominated assets so that their foreign exchange (FX) position was squared. 
In contrast, foreign bank branches were left without such obligation (Shin 2010, 179). As a 
result, foreign bank short-term debts piled up rapidly and exceeded those of domestic banks 
after the second quarter (Q2) of 2006 (Table 5). 
When capital inflows into Korea declined under the worldwide subprime loan crisis, the 
Korean won sharply depreciated (almost 30% in one month). At the same time, the ratio of 
international reserve to the foreign short-term debt fell rapidly from over 200% in 2006 to 
126.4% in Q3 of 2008 (Table 5). The Korean economy was almost in the second financial crisis. 
                                                        
16. Their order book amounted to 67.02 million cgt (compensated gross tons) at the end of December 
2008, representing 36.7%, the biggest share of the world (Clarkson Research Services, excerpt from 
Nexans, Shipbuilding White Paper, December 2008.  
http://www.nexans.us/Corporate/2009/wp_shipbuilding2008.pdf. [Accessed May 15, 2011]). 
17. As shipbuilding generally takes 2-4 years from contract until delivery, it was necessary for Korean 
shipbuilders to hedge exchange risk.  
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Korea could avoid the crisis only thanks to a $30 billion currency swap agreed with the US 
Federal Reserve Board in October 2008.  
A major cause of the renewed upsurge of short-term debts resides in the framework of 
financial regulation dominated by the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF). Since the 
Bank of Korea (BOK) does not have autonomous status in Korea, misjudgment of the MOSF 
has little chance for self-rectification.  
The Lee Myung-bak government, which took power in February 2008, established the 
Financial Services Commission (FSC) to replace the Financial Supervisory Commission 
(former FSC) and granted it full authority of financial regulations (Park 2010, 55, 59). Under 
the new regime, the function of MOSF’ Division of Financial Policy was theoretically 
transferred to the new FSC. In practice, MOSF, as the primary coordinator of all economic 
policies, continues to hold strong influence on financial matters (Park 2010, 58). Just like the 
former FSC, the new FSC is associated with the MOSF by parachute appointments. The 
chairman, the vice chairman, and one of the five commissioners of the new FSC are former 
high-ranking officials of MOF, MOFE, and MOSF who share similar technocratic career 
paths.18 
Under the current regime, the BOK is designated to play important roles in maintaining 
financial stability – the management of the payment and settlement system and emergency 
liquidity provision to banks as the lender of last resort. For the same purpose, BOK is 
responsible for providing information on economy, financial markets, and financial institutions. 
However, BOK’s authorities in financial regulations are not clearly defined. The FSC Act 
recognizes FSC as a guardian of financial stability while the BOK Act does not explicitly 
include the maintenance of stability in its missions. The Financial Supervisory Services (FSS), 
                                                        
18. FSC website. http://www.fsc.go.kr/eng/ab/ab0401.jsp. (Accessed June 8, 2011) 
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the executive hand of the FSC, acknowledges only small roles for BOK and frequently refuses 
providing BOK with information collected in their supervisory operations (Park 2010, 59).19 
Without an independent supervisory body, the MOSF overlooked the risk of short-term 
foreign debts creeping through forward contracts. A high-ranking BOK official informed the 
author that the central bank unofficially called the government’s attention to the increasing debts 
before the Lehman shock. However, government officials, particularly those of the MOSF, did 
not listen to the BOK warning.20 They paid little attention to the short-term debts for mainly 
two reasons. 
First, the government allowed a rapid enhancement of short-term borrowings by the 
banks in the belief that the banking sector was now on a much stronger foundation after the 
successful financial restructuring with broad foreign participation. Although big chaebol firms 
strengthened the self-financing capability during the restructuring period, smaller enterprises 
and households still heavily depended on bank credits and welcomed the expansion of financial 
resources in the market. 
Second, the government did not ask foreign banks to square their position with foreign 
currency-denominated assets because it wrongly believed that their assets were mostly held in 
foreign currencies and their main offices were powerful enough to help their subsidiaries in 
times of crisis (Shin 2010, 179-81). The government’s expectation was betrayed by a large 
capital flight by the foreign banks. 
The government-led financial system was quite effective in the quick and deep financial 
restructuring after the AFC. However, it turned out to be still vulnerable to external financial 
turmoil during the GFC because the wrong judgment by the government could not be rectified 
by any independent supervisory body.  
 
                                                        
19. This refusal of providing information was confirmed by an anonymous high rank official of BOK in 
author’s interview. This official also said that FSC and FSS had often rejected BOK requests for joint 
supervisory operation that is allowed by the BOK Act (February 10, 2010, Seoul). 
20. Author’s anonymous interview with a high ranking BOK official (March 4, 2011, Seoul). 
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4.3 The Thai case 
In Thailand, as mentioned above, both the government and banks were reluctant to accept state 
interventionism in the financial market, which made the restructuring process slow. The delay of 
the restructuring in turn strengthened the conservative and risk-averse behavior of the banks. 
This behavior is also reinforced by the painful experience of the AFC (Chalongphob and 
Somchai 2009, 3). As a result, external exposure of Thai banks were kept low and consequently 
helped Thailand escape from the subprime loan crisis. Thai baht remained relatively stable.21  
In fact, Thai banks did not hold as much foreign short-term debt as their Korean 
counterpart prior to the Lehman shock (in 2008 Q3). According to Table 6, the amount was 4.5 
billion US dollars, representing only 5.7% of the total external debt (compared with 43.6% for 
Korean banks). Although half of Thailand’s external debts were short-term, they were fully 
covered by international reserve. The ratio to foreign short-term debts reached as high as 
271.7% in Q3 of 2008 (compared with Korea’s 126.4%).  
Furthermore, while one small bank, ThaiBank, needed to be recapitalized in 2008 
because of high exposure to subprime-related toxic assets such as CDO (collateralized debt 
obligation), most of the banks were only marginally exposed. The banking sector’s exposure to 
foreign assets was 1.2% of the total assets as of August 2008, and only 0.04% of the total assets 
were related to CDO investment (Bank of Thailand 2008).  
The reasons for Thai commercial banks’ low dependence on foreign short-term 
borrowings and their limited exposure to the toxic assets are found both in the commercial bank 
side and in the bank regulator side.  
Commercial banks’ lending behavior, as mentioned above, was very conservative, due 
to the slow pace of financial restructuring and their experience in the AFC. They hesitated to 
have a finger in subprime loans. 
                                                        
21. Between December 2007 and November 2008, the exchange rate of baht against the US dollar 
depreciated by 8.3% while the Korean won depreciated by 96%. The depreciation rates were 16% in 
Indonesia, 17% in Malaysia, and 8% in Singapore (Shirai 2009, 35). 
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The bank regulator also learned lessons from the financial crisis of 1997 and reinforced 
its conservative policy stance. For instance, the BOT strengthened the regulation and 
supervision on commercial banks during the 2000s. Both domestic and foreign bankers found 
that BOT was very conservative and eager to control everything related to banking. In an 
interview with the author, a Thai banker said that BOT was much more concerned with bank 
soundness than lending to real sectors.22 According to a Japanese banker operating in Thailand, 
BOT does not permit the self-assessment of NPLs by commercial banks, a practice widely 
accepted in the world today.23  
The Thaksin government which had a more interventionist tendency than its post-AFC 
predecessors, tried to weaken the BOT regulations but its attempt was averted by the September 
2006 coup. After that event, the BOT regained its authority and even succeeded to consolidate 
its legal independence in 2008. 
 
 
5. Conclusion and implications 
This study has traced the continuity and change of the financial systems in Korea and Thailand 
in relation to the two grave crises: AFC and GFC.  
As the path-dependence approach argues, institutions, once firmly established, have a 
powerful tendency of persistence. However, as success and/or failure of the existing institutions 
transform interest and power of the concerned actors and as a consequence, the existing system 
may be perceived as ill-functional or unsatisfactory, it may be put under strong pressure for 
transformation.  
                                                        
22. An anonymous interview by the author (Sept.2, 2011, Bangkok). 
23. Author’s anonymous interview (August 30, 2011, Bangkok). In addition, the same Thai banker cited 
in fn.22 said that BOT usually takes long time for procedures to permit new financial products that 
commercial banks develop. 
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In Korea, the “rent-for-enterprises” financial system characterized by strong 
government intervention and the absorption of rent by chaebol firms dominating the non-
banking sectors faced challenges from technocrats, democratic forces, and foreign investors. As 
a result, deregulation and liberalization of the financial market were realized during the 1980s 
and 90s. However, due to the strengthened chaebol influence, the reforms sharply expanded 
foreign debts taken by banks and other financial institutions.  
In contrast, Thailand had a “rent-for-banks” financial system in which the state took a 
hands-off policy except for measures to exclude foreign banks and to maintain macro-economic 
stability. The biggest beneficiaries were oligopolistic private banks. By the early 1990s, this 
system faced multiple problems including a saving-investment gap, increasing antipathy against 
oligopolistic business groups, and foreign demand for liberalization. As the political parties 
became more influential, government policy became more expansionary and interventionist. As 
a compromise between conservative banks/technocrats and emerging forces, the liberalization 
of the financial sector took the form of offshore-market opening, which brought enormous 
foreign-money inflow and the debt crisis.  
Ironically, the serious financial crisis in 1997/98 helped the resurgence of traditional 
institutional configurations of the financial system: The interventionist state and chaebol firms 
expanding outside of the banking sector in Korea and the conservative state and oligopolistic 
banks in Thailand. Thanks to active and decisive government intervention, the restructuring of 
the banking sector was speedy and deep in Korea while it was slow and shallow in Thailand.  
Ironically again, the successful restructuring helped strengthen bank propensity to 
borrow foreign money in Korea while the slowness of the Thai restructuring only reinforced 
conservative lending and borrowing behavior. Furthermore, the institutional legacies which 
resurged during the period of restructuring reinforced positive foreign borrowing by Korean 
banks and timid borrowing by Thai banks. In Korea, due to the weakness of the regulatory 
authority of the central bank, the misjudgment of the finance ministry about the behavior of 
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domestic branches of foreign banks could not be rectified in time. As a result, Korea almost 
came to the brink of another financial crisis in 2008. In contrast, GFC’s adverse effect on the 
Thai financial market was minimal partially because the central bank of Thailand successfully 
resisted Thaksin’s pressures and rigidly regulated the financial market. 
This study provides two theoretical implications for the broader literature on 
globalization and institutional evolution. 
First, institutions matter even in the highly globalized world. Global financial forces 
may increasingly compel smaller countries to deregulate and liberalize their financial markets 
so that they are congruent with global standards. The smaller economies are especially 
vulnerable in a severe global crisis. Under such conditions, they are further forced to adapt their 
domestic system to the global rules. Disagreeing with such expectations, this paper proves that 
financial systems with different institutional characteristics adapt themselves differently under 
similarly strong international pressures for liberalization and in similarly severe financial crises. 
The path dependence approach is correct in its insistence on institutional stickiness. 
Second, different from the critical juncture literature,24 this study demonstrates that 
severe crises could reinforce traditional institutions instead of catalyzing a new institutional 
configuration. This phenomenon occurs when a serious crisis weakens change-oriented forces 
and/or reappraises traditional institutions under high uncertainties as they once functioned well. 
 
                                                        
24. For example, see Krasner (1984), Mahoney (2001), and Pierson (2004). 
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Table 1. Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) and NPL ratio of Korean and Thai commercial banks (%)  
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Korea 
CAR 11.7 11.2 11.1 12.1 13.0 12.8 12.3 12.3 14.2 
NPLs 3.4 2.4 2.6 1.9 1.2 0.8 0.7 1.1 1.5 
Thailand 
CAR 13.3 13.0 13.4 12.4 13.2 13.6 14.8 13.8 n.a. 
NPLs 11.5 16.5 13.5 11.9 9.1 8.4 7.9 5.7 n.a. 
Source: IMF (2007, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 1. Bank loans and discounts in Korea (Billion Won) 
 
Source: Bank of Korea website. 
 
 
Figure 2. Loan by commercial banks in Thailand (Millions of Baht) 
 
Source: Bank of Thailand website. 
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Figure 3. Loan/deposit ratio of all commercial banks in Thailand (%) 
 
Source: Bank of Thailand website. 
 
 
Figure 4. Loan & Discounts/Deposit* Ratio of Commercial Banks in Korea(%) 
 
Source: Bank of Korea website. 
Note*: Deposit in domestic currency without certificate deposit (CDs). 
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Table 2. Corporate finance in Korea: Flow-of-Funds, business sector (Net, %, 2002-2005) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Bank Loans 49.4 42.5 10.6 17.3 
Non-bank loans 10.8 -3.8 6.0 13.2 
Stocks 34.5 35.9 33.8 19.8 
Commercial Papers -4.5 -5.7 -6.3 3.2 
Corporate Bonds -9.4 -2.5 0.2 7.8 
Foreign Debts and 
Claims -3.4 9.5 13.6 5.9 
Others 22.7 24.1 42.2 32.8 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 
Source: Bank of Korea website (1968 SNA). 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Corporate finance in Thailand: Flow-of-Funds, business sector (Net, %, 2002-2005) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Short-term Loans -1.5 -2.8 -2.4 0.8 
Long-term Loans -23.3 -75.6 68.1 7.2 
Share Capital 63.1 104.1 20.3 31.7 
Commercial Bills 101.6 114.3 18.3 15.2 
Debentures 8.3 79.0 5.9 12.7 
Mortgages 2.1 13.4 5.9 4.0 
Foreign Debts and 
Claims -31.6 -132.6 9.8 26.1 
Others -18.6 0.2 -25.8 2.3 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 
Source: National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) website. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Bank Z-score* of Korea and Thailand (2000-2008)   
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Korea 2.2 2.8 3.2 4.7 8.0 6.9 6.7 7.7 9.6 
Thailand 1.4 1.6 7.0 5.5 4.7 9.0 8.2 4.3 4.7 
Source: The dataset including this score is provided by the World Bank website (access on May 7, 
2011): 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:2
0696167~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html 
Note*: Z-score is estimated as (ROA+equity/assets)/sd(ROA). I am grateful to Jean-Claude Maswana 
for his suggestion about this score. Here sd(ROA), the standard deviation of ROA, is estimated as 
a 5-year moving average. A higher z-score indicates that the bank is more stable.  
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Table 5. External Debt of Korea, 2006-2008 (Billion US dollars) 
Gross External 
Debt 
2006 
Q1 
2006 
Q2 
2006 
Q3 
2006
Q4 
2007
Q1 
2007
Q2 
2007
Q3 
2007
Q4 
2008
Q1 
2008 
Q2 
2008 
Q3 
2008
Q4 
TOTAL 172.9 196.3 212.3 225.2 247.6 271.0 295.9 333.4 358.2 366.6 365.1 317.4
 Long-term 97.8 100.8 104.8 111.5 117.6 133.7 150.2 173.2 184.0 189.8 175.5 167.5
 Short-term 75.2 95.5 107.4 113.7 130.0 137.3 145.6 160.2 174.2 176.8 189.6 149.9
Total Debt of 
Domestic 
Banks 
64.5 72.7 80.7 82.1 87.4 93.0 102.3 109.0 118.3 126.5 122.1 97.0
   Short-term 33.0 39.7 45.0 44.3 48.1 46.7 53.3 54.6 60.5 66.7 65.4 42.6
Total Debt of 
Domestic 
Branches of 
Foreign 
Banks 
28.4 42.2 49.9 54.4 66.8 75.0 76.4 83.9 92.6 84.2 97.4 72.4
   Short-term 26.7 40.1 47.7 51.8 63.9 70.7 71.5 79.3 87.8 80.4 93.9 67.8
International 
Reserves / 
Short-term 
Debt (%)* 
289.2 234.9 212.4 210.1 187.6 182.6 176.7 163.6 151.7 146.0 126.4 134.2
Source: Bank of Korea website. 
Note*: Author’s calculation.        
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. External Debt of Thailand, 2006-2008 (Billion US dollars) 
Gross External 
Debt 
2006 
Q1 
2006 
Q2 
2006 
Q3 
2006
Q4 
2007
Q1 
2007
Q2 
2007
Q3 
2007
Q4 
2008
Q1 
2008 
Q2 
2008 
Q3 
2008
Q4 
TOTAL 66.0 67.0 68.6 70.0 69.5 69.9 73.0 74.4 80.3 78.9 78.8 76.1
 Long-term 38.7 39.9 39.0 42.7 40.8 39.1 40.0 40.4 41.8 41.2 41.1 42.5
 Short-term 27.2 27.1 29.6 27.2 28.6 30.7 33.0 34.0 38.6 37.7 37.7 33.6
Total Debt of 
Banks 8.4 6.9 8.9 6.7 6.4 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.8 7.7 7.2 7.2
   Short-term 5.0 3.1 5.6 3.2 3.8 3.7 3.8 4.0 4.3 5.3 4.5 4.5
International 
Reserves / 
Short-term 
Debt (%)* 
203.0 214.2 208.2 245.8 247.5 237.6 244.2 257.1 285.2 280.6 271.7 330.3 
Source: Bank of Thailand website. 
Note*: Author’s calculation.    
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Abstract (in Japanese) 
 
要約 
1997 年のアジア金融危機の後、韓国とタイは金融再建を成功裡に進め、銀行セクタ
ーの健全性を回復した。しかし、2008 年にリーマンショックが両国の金融市場を襲
ったとき、その衝撃は異なる様相を見せた。韓国では、金融再建の成果がタイよりも
優れていたにもかかわらず、2008 年には第二の金融危機の瀬戸際まで追い込まれた。
他方、タイは衝撃をたやすく切り抜けた。この逆説的な違いを解明するために、本論
文は制度の経路依存性の視点に立ち、二ヶ国の金融システムの形成と変化に関する歴
史的経路の違いに焦点を当てる。結論としては、韓国では国家主導の金融再建が成功
したことで、銀行の活発な貸出行動が促進されたのに対し、タイにおける民間セクタ
ー主導の改革は銀行の保守的な貸出行動を強化しただけであったと論じている。そし
て、制度の変化には決定的分岐点があるとする従来の理論とは異なって、深刻な経済
危機が両国ではかえって制度の遺産を強化することになったと分析する。その結果、
韓国の銀行は攻撃的とも言える対外借入をするようになった一方、タイの銀行は対外
借入には非常に慎重になった。これらの違いによって、両国のリーマンショックに対
する異なる脆弱性は説明できるのである。 
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